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Abstract  
 
Motivated by a lack of availability of theoretical review of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO) underpricing, this paper recognized a lack of presentation 
of theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the 
literature. This makes scholars and investors interested in IPO underpricing 
research to face difficulty when it comes to the decision to employ IPO 
underpricing models. Hence, this paper provides a concise but comparatively 
adequate review of competing IPO underpricing theories. This review 
covered 13 theoretical models based on information asymmetry, institutional 
explanations, ownership and control reasons, and behavioral explanations to 
elucidate the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. Based on this review, the 
authors found that the underpricing phenomenon is eventually elucidated by 
the existence of information asymmetry amongst key IPO parties including 
the issuing firm, the underwriter, and the investor. Across the 13 reviewed 
IPO underpricing theories, the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) 
theory emerges as a compelling asymmetric information model. This is 
because it solves the problem of information asymmetry between the issuer 
and investor while accounting for the endogenous relationship between 
underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Surprisingly, only a comparatively small number of corporate events have garnered much attention from 
scholars, the business world, media, and the general public when compared to initial public offerings (IPOs). 
The general focus is on the high and occasionally remarkable first-day immediate returns that the share prices 
of newly listed firms record. Recently, Ritter (2008) indicates that 108 IPO firms floated part of their 
shareholdings in 2017, so raising total proceeds of US$24.53 billion. The money left on the table by these 
United States (U.S.) IPO issuers accounted for US$3.69 billion, attracting an average underpricing level of 
15%. The IPO underpricing phenomenon is reported not only in the developed equity markets such as the U.S. 
but is also recognized in virtually in every stock market around the globe. In an annually updated report in 
January 9, 2018, Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) document average, country-level underpricing 
ranging from 3.3% to 270.1% across 54 nations over the last three decades. It is not fully understood why 
entrepreneur founders across countries sell their own shares to initial IPO investors at large discount, an act 
that constitutes a considerable cost of going public (Liu & Ritter, 2011). In fact, what is puzzling is trying to 
understand the willingness of IPO owners across countries to give away part of their firms very cheaply, 
particularly given the existence of substantial heterogeneity in underpricing across national economies, 
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specifically within industrial and emerging nations. In Loughran et al. (1994) report, average underpricing for 
advanced countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and Denmark is recorded as being 44.7%, 7.4%, and 
25.9%, respectively, while similar figures for developing nations of Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Pakistan are 
239.8%, 4.2%, and 22.1%, also respectively. What makes average underpricing to be as low as 4.2% and as high 
as 239.8% in emerging economies such as Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Also what makes average underpricing 
figures to be as high as 44.7% and as low as 7.4% in Japan and Denmark, respectively, these countries being 
advanced economies.  
The critical question is what theoretical model and determining factors can explain such puzzling 
variations in underpricing across global IPO markets?. This has inspired the emergence of a large theoretical 
literature in the last four decades pursuing rational explanations as to why IPOs are underpriced differently 
across countries. As shown below in Figure 1, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002), 
Ritters and Welch (2002), Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya (2003), Kennedy, Sivakumar, and Vetzal 
(2006), Ljungqvist (2007) and Fitza and Dean (2016) have reviewed various IPO underpricing theories based 
on information asymmetry, institutional explanations, ownership and control reasons, and behavioral 
explanations.  
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Figure-1. Dominant IPO Underpricing Theories. 
 
The problem is that the availability of a systemic review that presents a variety of IPO underpricing 
theories at once is absent in the literature. Consequently, this makes it difficult for researchers and investors to 
understand the relationship between those models in comprehending the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. 
For this reason, this paper is motivated to provide a brief but comprehensive review of a number of 
underpricing theories discussed in the literature. This paper is organized into seven sections. Section 2 
presents a brief discussion of why IPO companies decide to go public while Section 3 also presents the key 
IPO parties in order to understand the mechanism of information asymmetry in the IPO market. Section 4 
provides a discussion of seven competing asymmetric information models. Section 5 renders a presentation of 
four theories based on institutional explanations while Section 6 presents two models based on ownership and 
control reasons. Section 7 provides one theoretical model based on behavioral explanations. Section 8 
concludes this paper.  
 
2. Why Do Firms Go Public? 
The decision to go public marks a significant landmark in the life of un-listed or private firms. The 
interesting question is why a privately owned company decides to go public. There are three main reasons 
explaining why a firm decides to list its shares on a stock market as shown in Figure 2. Firstly, by going 
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public, a firm‟s owners can sell part of their shareholdings in the company in exchange for cash, enabling them 
to utilize the proceeds of the sale for other expenditures or to diversify their investments (Loughran & Ritter, 
2002). Secondly, by going public, a firm can access public equity capital to obtain less expensive funding for 
new investment plans, finance further business expansion, and repay outstanding loans (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
That is, when a private firm reaches a stage where the financial capacity of the current shareholders is limited, 
and cannot finance further growth plans, entering the equity market provides an alternative financing choice. 
Thirdly, by going public, firms can reap other indirect benefits, such as increasing corporate publicity, 
enhancing the promotion or advertising of the firm‟s trademarks and products, and attracting a different 
caliber of skilled employees (Demers & Lewellen, 2003).  
 
Why Go 
Public?
Firm s owners sell part of 
their shareholdings in 
exchange for cash
Raise capital with lower cost 
for new investment plans or 
loans repayment
Seeking corporate publicity, 
enhancing firm s 
trademarks, and attracting 
caliber of skilled employees 
 
Figure-2. Reasons for IPO Firm to Go Public. 
 
However, as well as certain advantages for going public, there are some disadvantages associated with 
this decision. For instance, a loss of control by business founders and current shareholders can be an obvious 
consequence due to public flotation of part of their shareholding (Smart & Zutter, 2003). That is, as the 
shareholding base is widened with public flotation, new shareholders gain voting rights that could dilute the 
voting rights of the founders and current shareholders (Dolvin & Jordan, 2008). Besides, by going public the 
management of IPO firms take on additional legal and moral obligations in the form of rigid information 
transparency and disclosure requirements to act according to the best interests of the larger group of 
shareholders (Ritterr, 1987). Upon public listing, IPO firms might compromise their competitive advantage by 
being obligated to increase their information disclosure about current operations and expansion plans as 
required by security exchange commissions (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001).  
By going public IPO firms have to bear direct costs of public listing including listing fees, underwriting 
fees, and brokerage, legal and accounting fees, share registry costs, and also other indirect costs, such as the 
increased cost of preparing annual financial reports in compliance with disclosure and listing standards and 
codes (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). In summary, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that despite the 
associated disadvantages of going public, approaching the equity capital market remains an efficient option for 
firms to provide sustainable financing sources and quick access to liquidate part of their holdings. Since the 
advantages of going public outweigh the disadvantages, it is imperative to understand the role of key IPO 
parties. This is discussed in the next section below. 
 
3. Key IPO Parties  
Ljungqvist (2007) states that three important parties are involved in every IPO. These are the issuing 
firm, the underwriter, and the investor as shown in Figure 3.  
 
3.1. The Issuing Firm  
The issuer of an IPO firm is the first important part of the IPO market, and it lists part of its holdings in 
an existing or newly established company for the first time in a stock market. It does this either through 
selling existing shares or creating new ones where the former and the latter are secondary and primary share 
offerings, respectively. The offering could either be one of those two methods or a mixture of the two. The 
main goal of the issuer is to obtain the highest possible offer price for the floated shares. In general, the issuing 
firm has the absolute discretion to decide how much it needs to float in compliance with the requirements of 
every stock exchange authority in every country (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). IPO literature including Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) shows that IPO issuers can be classified 
as high quality and low quality (see Figure 3). They argue that the former own comprehensive private 
information about the future cash flows of their operations; hence they know exactly the precise present value 
of their firms while the latter are unsure about the intrinsic value of their companies. The issuer appoints an 
underwriter to work as an advisory body setting up a suitable offer price and preparing the necessary 
documentation in compliance with the stock market listing requirements to ensure successful listing. Palmiter 
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(1999) and Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) argue that high-quality IPO issuers may be reluctant to disclose the 
true present value of their firms, fearing the loss of competitive advantage if they communicate positive 
information related to their future investment opportunities directly to the market. Consequently, Welch 
(1989) argues that by protecting their market competitive advantage, quality IPO issuers create an 
asymmetric information problem with IPO investors as shown above in Figure 3. Subsequently, those IPO 
issuers work to solve this problem by offering underpricing as compensation for IPO investors to differentiate 
themselves from low-quality IPO issuers. 
 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms
Underwriters
IPO  Investors
Informed
Non-Informed
High Quality 
Issuers
Low Quality 
Issuers
Reputable 
Underwriters
Non-reputable 
Underwriters
Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric Information 
 
Figure-3. Key IPO Parties. 
 
 
In contrast, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) argue that information 
asymmetry exists between the issuer and the underwriter of the IPO firm when IPO issuers are unsure about 
the present value of their firms; then they refer the decision to the underwriters in order to determine the 
present value of their firms. Spatt and Srivastava (1991) show that once the underwriters take over then, they 
either employ their advisory team to value the IPO firm or solicit the true value of their firms from 
institutional investors who are financially able to provide an an accurate valuation of the firm. This is done in 
exchange for receiving a reduced share price of the IPO firm as shown in Figure 3. In this way, the 
underwriter becomes the second most important party in the IPO market. 
 
3.2. The Underwriter 
The underwriting bank normally takes the form of a large investment bank or commercial bank that in 
practice conducts the issuing process on behalf of the issuer. The main function of underwriters is to prepare 
the IPO firm to go public in exchange for underwriting fees, generally referred to as “underwriting spread” 
(Chen & Mohan, 2002). To do so, the underwriters have to buy the floating stake that the issuers decide to sell 
to the public and then the underwriter resells it back to the public (Chahine, 2008). Hence, underwriters 
thoroughly evaluate the IPO firms in order to decide the desired offer price and price range that enables the 
IPO firm to be successfully listed. The level of success of an underwriter largely relies on its financial 
experience, hence the more IPOs it underwrites, the more it is considered to have a market reputation for 
successful listing (Kirkulak & Davis, 2005).  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Lewellen (2006) argue that underwriters can be classified into reputable and 
non-reputable underwriters as shown in Figure 3. The former tend to control a large stake in the IPO market, 
have superior advisory teams, and tend to have established connections with institutional investors including 
hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. They can subsequently conduct thorough evaluations for IPO 
firms. Not surprisingly, reputable underwriters are expensive to hire in exchange for the premium service they 
offer. In contrast, Jones and Swaleheen (2010) contend that non-returnable underwriters tend to have small 
market presentation, small advisory teams, and limited business connections; they tend to charge cheaper 
underwriting fees for taking the IPO firm public. Lowry and Shu (2002) argue that underwriters sometimes 
bear the risk of potentially non-full IPO subscription; hence they buy the IPO company at a discount to 
compensate for this risk. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) argue that underwriters have the incentive to 
underprice the IPO firm in order to attract more IPO investors, reduce marketing efforts, and avoid non-full 
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IPO subscription. Ruud (1993) contends that although IPO issuers may be involved in a restricted number of 
offerings, underwriters are permanent players in the IPO market. They fear to set a low offer price that could 
result in upsetting future IPO issuers from taking their firms public at a large discount. 
However, Ljungqvist (2007) argues that the asymmetric information problem may exist between 
underwriters and IPO issuers when the former intentionally underprice the latter for personal gain. Liu and 
Ritter (2010) contend that some underwriters take advantage of their market knowledge and position for their 
own benefit by receiving side payments from investors. They want this in exchange for a discount offering or 
large allocation of IPO stocks, a practice that is known as “spinning”. Lowry and Shu (2002) argue that 
underwriters also fear to set the offer price of IPO firms too high because this could result in upsetting or even 
being sued by angry IPO investors on the grounds the underwriter overpriced the IPO. Ljungqvist (2007) 
however, asserts the asymmetric information problem may occur between underwriters and IPO investors 
when the former deliberately overprice the IPO company, thus benefiting the issuer and themselves at the 
expense of investors. Now that we understand the role of the issuer and the underwriter, the role of the third 
part of the IPO party, the investor, is discussed below. 
 
3.3. The Investor 
The investor of an IPO firm constitutes the third important part of the IPO parties. IPO investors tend to 
be either short-term or long-term investors of which the latter subscribe to the IPO offering and hold shares 
for a long investment horizon (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). The former, on the other hand, “flip” shares on 
the first listing day of the IPO firm seeking a quick return (Ljungqvist, 2007). IPO literature frequently 
differentiates between two types of IPO investors including retail and institutional investors (Autore, Smart, 
Boulton, & Zutter, 2014; Hopp & Dreher, 2013; Ling & Ryngaert, 1997). Retail investors tend to be individual 
or private investors and frequently claimed to have limited financial capacity and in-depth knowledge when it 
comes to analyzing the IPO prospectus (Chenn & Kao, 2006; Dorn, 2009).  
On the other hand, institutional investors tend to be financially sophisticated and understand the 
workings of mutual funds, pension funds, investment banks, and hedge funds. They know that these 
institutions have huge access to large pools of financial resources (Cornelli, Goldreich, & Ljungqvist, 2006). 
Sullivan and Unite (2001) and Fitza and Dean (2016) argue that due to their large financial knowledge and 
capability, institutional investors can be repeat customers to underwriters and they have a mutual interest and 
business relationship in which both parties hope to maintain. This relationship allows the latter to have 
informational advantages in terms of accessing private information about IPO firms and receiving higher 
share allocations compared to retail investors. Acknowledging this information gap between retail and 
institutional investors, Beatty and Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), Michaely and Shaw (1994) and Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) argue that retail investors can be seen as non-informed investors compared to institutional 
investors who can be viewed as informed investors in the IPO market (see Figure 3).  
In sum, depending on the status of the IPO issuers, underwriters, and investors, an asymmetric 
information environment tends to exist between those IPO parties and causes IPO underpricing. In response 
to the mechanism of this asymmetric information environment between the IPO parties, Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001), Kennedy et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist (2007) argue that several information asymmetry 
theories have been developed to explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. Their rationale depends on the 
nature of the information asymmetry that exists between IPO parties. 
 
4. Information Asymmetry Theories   
This section presents a number of competing information asymmetry models based on the asymmetric 
information problem between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and underwriters, issuers and 
investors, and informed and uninformed investors. These include the Principal-agent, Ex-ante uncertainty, 
Book-building, Signaling, Winner‟s Curse, and Certification theories as shown below in Figure 4.  
 
4.1. Principal-Agent  
Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) introduced a “principal-agent” model theorizing the cause 
of IPOs underpricing as a response to information asymmetry between two IPO parties including IPO issuers 
and underwriters as shown in Figure 5. The authors argue that the latter underprice the former by employing 
their superior market knowledge, reducing marketing effort, and benefiting buy-side clients and themselves on 
account of issuers. 
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Figure-4. Classification of Information Asymmetry Theories. 
 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms
Underwriters
Asymmetric Information 
· Principal-agent
The underwriter underprices the issuing firm to reduce marketing 
effort and benefit buy-side clients on account of issuers
 
Figure-5. Information Asymmetry Based on Principal-agent Rationale. 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) also argue for the presence of a „dark side‟ of underwriters by stressing the 
possibility of agency problems occurring between underwriters and IPO issuers. This could well explain the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing. Confirming the presence of the agency problem between IPO issuing firms 
and their underwriters, Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that Credit Suisse First Boston was fined $100 
million in 2002 due to receiving side payments for causing deliberate underpricing of underwritten offerings. 
Conceptually, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that the “principal-agent” model can be refuted if 
underpricing exists for firms underwriting their own offerings since there is no conflict of interest and no 
asymmetric information to be concerned about. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the “principal-
agent” model and find no underpricing difference between self-underwritten IPOs and non-self-underwritten 
IPOs, thus questioning the validity of the principal-agent model. Finally, the principal-agent model only 
captures the problem of information asymmetry between underwriters and IPO issuers. Yet it is silent on the 
problem of information asymmetry between investors and underwriters, issuers and investors, and informed 
and uninformed investors. 
 
4.2. Ex-Ante Uncertainty  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underpricing of IPO firms should increase in response to an increase 
of “ex-ante uncertainty” related to the issuing firm as shown in Figure 6. 
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IPO PartiesIssuing Firms IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
· Ex-ante Uncertainty 
 
Investors demand 
underpricing to compensate 
for ex-ante uncertainty
 
Figure-6. Information Asymmetry Based on Ex-ante Uncertainty Rationale. 
 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) demonstrate that ex-ante uncertainty of the issuing firm with investors 
can, for example, include matters related to the age, size, use of IPO proceeds, and type of IPO firm. Ritter 
(1984) and Rock (1986) found that the degree of ex-ante uncertainty is a decreasing function of the age of the 
IPO firm. Engelen and Van Essen (2010) discovered that younger firms create more ex-ante uncertainty about 
the value of the company; in turn, investors demand higher underpricing for younger companies. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) used IPO size to proxy for ex-ante uncertainty, where they empirically documented that larger 
offerings are normally offered by established firms, while smaller offerings are offered by speculative firms, 
naming this phenomenon “empirical regularity”. Banerjee, Dai, and Shrestha (2011) and Autore et al. (2014) 
empirically documented the presence of a negative association between the size of the proceeds of IPO firms 
and the amount of underpricing investors seek to compensate for this risk. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Rock (1986) argued that information related to the use of IPO proceeds is 
useful in reducing ex-ante uncertainty because investors would be better informed about a firm‟s reasons for 
going public. Leone, Rock, and Willenborg (2007) found that disclosure of proceeds used for debt repayment 
purposes, as compared to non-debt repayment uses , increases ex-ante uncertainty regarding the true value of 
the firm. Prior literature discriminated between two types of IPO firms, i.e. privatization and private 
companies (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013). Privatization company IPOs often involve 
older firms and well known as relatively government regulated and well established industries, while private 
firm IPOs tend to be young, small, and relatively unknown (Joness, Megginson, Nash, & Netter, 1999). Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang (2007) found that the ex-ante uncertainty of investors is higher for private firm IPOs than 
for privatized IPOs. Although the “ex-ante uncertainty” hypothesis is empirically supported by Michaely and 
Shaw (1994), Mok and Hui (1998) and Brau and Fawcett (2006) it cannot explain the substantial underpricing 
that exists in some countries, particularly in developing markets (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). Finally, the ex-
ante uncertainty only captures the problem of information asymmetry between IPO issuers and investors. It 
does not capture the problem of information asymmetry between investors and underwriters, issuers and 
investors, and informed and uninformed investors. 
 
4.3. Book-Building  
The book-building theories of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt 
and Srivastava (1991) collectively argue for the presence of asymmetric information between IPO issuers and 
institutional investors, assuming that institutional investors possess superior information than both 
underwriters and issuing firms as shown in Figure 7. Hence, the process of book-building reveals valuable 
information about an issuer by institutional investors. Underwriters compensate truth-telling institutional 
investors who bid aggressively, in turn, revealing favorable information with larger allocations of shares. 
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IPO Parties
Underwriters
IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
Institutional investors possess superior 
information compared to both underwriters 
and issuing firms about the true value of the 
IPO firm. Hence, they demand underpricing 
in an effort to bid for part of the IPO
· Book-building  
 
Figure-7. Information Asymmetry Based on Book-building Rationale. 
 
In contrast, underwriters compensate truth-conservative institutional investors who bid conservatively, in 
turn, revealing no information with smaller allocations of shares. Loughran and Ritter (2002) support the 
usefulness of the book-building theory for divulging valuation information about the issuer, but argue that the 
book-building theory only explains a small percentage of IPO discounts. It does not explain the enormous 
underpricing that occurs in other markets, including developing markets. Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 
U.S. chief financial officers (CFOs) to seek their explanations for IPO underpricing and find that CFOs provide 
little support for the book-building explanation of underpricing. This subsequently leads to questioning the 
validity of the model in explaining underpricing across countries.  
Degeorge, Derrien, and Womack (2007) argue that the book-building model used to be popular during 
the 1990s when IPO issuers had the option to choose between different selling methods including auctioning , 
fixed offer , book-building  best offer, and book-building firm commitment. For example, in France in the 
1990s, for example, Degeorge et al. (2007) show that the IPO market was approximately divided between 
auctioned and book-built IPOs, while during the 2000s the auctions method becomes virtually extinct. In 
Japan, Kutsuna and Smith (2003) show that auctions rapidly disappeared after book-building was introduced in 
the Japanese IPO market. Ljungqvists, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) also document that nearly all countries‟ 
preexisting IPO pricing mechanisms have vanished or lost significant market share when book-building 
entered the scene. Finally, the book-building model only captures the problem of information asymmetry 
between IPO issuers and investors and investors and underwriters. As well, the model does not capture the 
problem of information asymmetry between: firstly, issuers and investors; and secondly, informed and 
uninformed investors. 
 
4.4. Signaling  
The signaling models1 of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) 
mutually assert that IPO firms‟ motivation to underprice is to “leave a good taste in investors‟ mouths”, where 
these models infer that IPO firms possess private information related to their future cash flows and are aware 
of their present value, with such private information not made available to investors. Hence, the asymmetric 
information problem exists between the issuers and investors requiring issuers to offer their firms at a 
discount to investors as shown in Figure 8. 
 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
· Signaling 
 
IPO issuers know the quality of their firms and also 
possess private information about the true value of 
the firm. This information is not available to 
investors making it hard for investors to 
differentiate between high quality and poor quality 
IPOs. Thus, IPO firms offer underpricing to 
distinguish themselves from low quality IPO issuers
 
Figure-8. Information Asymmetry Based on Signaling Rationale. 
                                                          
1 Both Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) employ underpricing as a quality “signal”, while Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) employ both underpricing 
and ownership retention rate as a quality “signal”. 
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The intuition behind these signaling models is that low quality issuers will be unwilling to tolerate the 
cost of the signal in order to mimic high quality issuers, meaning that after an IPO takes place the type of 
issuer is revealed exogenously (Ljungqvist, 2007). By bearing the high cost of the signal, high quality issuers 
are expected to make subsequent aftermarket decisions, including issuing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), 
which should be received favorably by investors. This will enable them to recoup their losses from 
underpricing by an increase in the firm‟s market value (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). Opposed to the premise 
of “signaling” models, Spiess and Pettway (1997); Gale and Stiglitz (1989), Garfinkel (1993), Leleux and 
Muzyka (1997), Espenlaub and Tonks (1998), and Kennedy et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that IPO 
companies do not recover underpricing costs after their first seasoned equity offering.  
The practicality of “signaling” models is also questioned by Ritter (2011) who describes them as “silly 
academic theories”, arguing that “it is unclear why underpricing is a more efficient signal than, say, 
committing to spend money on charitable donations or advertising”. Finally, the signalling model only 
captures the problem of information asymmetry between IPO issuers and investors while the model does not 
offer a remedy to the problem of information asymmetry between issuing firms and underwriters, investors 
and underwriters, and informed and uninformed investors. 
 
4.5. Winner’s Curse  
Rock (1986) introduces the “winner‟s curse” hypothesis in response to asymmetric information between 
uninformed and informed investors, asserting that neither the issuer nor the underwriter are well informed 
compared to institutional investors, who are better informed about the true value of an IPO firm as shown in 
Figure 9.  
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Employing their sophisticated (limited) financial 
knowledge, informed (uninformed) investors bid only 
(bid indiscriminately) for underpriced (underpriced and 
overpriced) IPOs leaving uninformed investors to 
receive full allocations in overpriced offerings. Hence, 
to ensure the continued participation of uninformed 
investors, issuers provide compensation by 
underpricing. 
 
Figure-9. Information Asymmetry Based on Winner‟s Curse Rationale. 
 
The author argues that institutional investors are indeed informed investors because they can employ 
their sophisticated financial knowledge to bid only for underpriced IPOs while uninformed investors employ 
their limited financial knowledge by biding indiscriminately for underpriced and overpriced IPOs. This 
information gap between informed and uninformed investors enables the latter to receive full allocations in 
overpriced offerings and create an “adverse selection” problem. Rock (1986) therefore argues that to ensure the 
perpetual participation of uninformed investors, issuers must provide compensation to alleviate “adverse 
selection” by underpricing. The winner‟s curse argument has enjoyed consistent empirical support as 
documented by Carters and Manaster (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Michaely and Shaw (1994), Banu 
(2002) and Brau and Fawcett (2006). It is, however, questioned by Beatty and Welch (1996), Lam and Yap 
(1998), Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Liu and Ritter (2011) as not having enough power to explain the high 
degree of underpricing, for instance, in developing markets.  
Additionally, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) state that the winners‟ curse model assumes that the 
percentage of uninformed and informed investors are exogenously fixed. They argue that participation of 
uninformed investors can be determined endogenously by incurring promotion costs in order to reduce the 
“adverse selection” problem faced by these investors, thus leading to lower underpricing. Finally, the winners‟ 
curse model only captures the problem of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. 
It does not provide an understanding of the problem of information asymmetry between issuing firms and 
underwriters, investors and underwriters, and IPO issuers and investors. 
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4.6. Certification  
Booth and Smith (1986) develop a model based on the assumption of asymmetric information between 
insiders who are shareholders and outsiders who are prospective subscribers to new issues as shown in Figure 
10. They suggest that issuing firms may be viewed as effectively “leasing” the brand name of an underwriter to 
certify that the issue price reflects available inside information. Consistent with this, Carters and Manaster 
(1990) show that the issuer‟s choice of underwriter reputation is inversely related to underpricing of IPOs.  
 
IPO PartiesIssuing Firms IPO  Investors
Asymmetric Information 
· Certification  
 
IPO issuers are aware of investors  concerns  about 
the true value of their firms. Hence, issuers employ, 
for example, reputable underwriters who certify the 
quality of the IPO of which underwriters demand 
the issuer to underprice the IPO to protect their 
market reputation
 
Figure-10. Information Asymmetry Based on Certification Rationale. 
 
Hence, the certification hypothesis argues that underwriters, particularly reputable ones can effectively 
certify the fair valuation of the offer price of the IPO firm, in turn providing investors with a third party 
guarantee (Lee, Taylor, & Walter, 1996). In line with the certification hypothesis, Lees and Wahal (2004) 
argue that this third party can include certifying the quality of the IPO firm by associating the offering with 
underwriters, auditors, lawyers, and venture capitalists with established market reputation. The function of 
this third party is to provide extra quality certification to the issuers in exchange for reducing information 
asymmetry between the issuing firm and investors. The certification hypothesis receives favorable supporting 
evidence by Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller, and Reilly (1993), Chishty, Hasan, and Smith (1996), Lin (1996) 
and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000). However, Tomczyk (1996) and Rasheed, Datta, and Chinta (1997) 
reject it with evidence concerning the prediction of the certification hypothesis.  
Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) argue that the certification hypothesis does not provide an adequate 
explanation of the extreme underpricing in developing countries as most developing IPOs in those countries 
employ reputable underwriters. Yet they still suffer from large underpricing compared to the underpricing of 
IPO firms associated with non-reputable underwriters. Finally, the certification hypothesis only captures the 
problem of information asymmetry between issuers and investors. It does not provide an explanation 
concerning the problem of information asymmetry between issuing firms and underwriters, investors and 
underwriters, and informed and uninformed investors. 
 
4.7. Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Theory 
Conceptually, as shown in Figure 11, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) model explains the phenomenon of 
IPO underpricing by combining the “winners‟ curse” hypothesis of Rock (1986), the “ex-ante uncertainty” 
hypothesis of Beatty and Ritter (1986), the “certification” hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986), and the 
“signaling” models of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989).  
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Figure-11. Interaction between the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Theory and Other Asymmetric Information Models. 
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Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) address the “winners‟ curse” hypothesis by arguing that participation of 
uninformed investors can be determined endogenously by incurring more promotion costs. This is achieved, 
for example, by hiring reputable underwriters to reduce the “adverse selection” problem faced by uninformed 
investors. This in turn leads to lower underpricing. They also address the “ex-ante uncertainty” hypothesis by 
arguing that Beatty and Ritter (1986) do not take into account IPO issuers‟ incentives to alleviate investors‟ 
ex-ante uncertainty by increasing promotion costs, for example, employing underwriters with prestigious 
market reputation. Furthermore they address the “certification” hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986) arguing 
that promotion costs can include the employment of a reputable underwriter or prestigious auditor as 
“certification” signals. These serve to verify the quality of the issuer that was endogenously determined by the 
issuer when they aim to sell part of their holdings. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) also address “signaling” 
models by arguing that when IPO issuers reduce their ownership retention rate and bear the cost of 
promotion activities such as employing a reputable underwriter, prestigious auditor, or providing voluntary 
disclosure, promotion activities can serve as substitutes to underpricing. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) revolutionized the IPO underpricing literature by providing the first 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence of the endogeneity problem between the key IPO parties. 
The authors assert that the issuers of IPO firms do not randomly select underwriters, and neither do 
underwriters randomly agree to underwrite IPO firms. Therefore, the decision to select an underwriter by the 
issuer is predetermined and it is likely to be based on their decision, at least in part, on the amount of 
underpricing they anticipate will occur. Consequently, this results in endogeneity bias when regressing 
underpricing on the choice of underwriter. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) model has two main premises and 
they are as follows:  
The first is that IPO owners care about underpricing, they are willing to stand to lose from it, and any 
such losses are proportionally conditional on the number of primary and secondary shares being sold.  
The second is that IPO owners can influence the degree of underpricing by promoting their offerings.  
The EWL theory emphasizes that neglecting the endogeneity in IPO issuers‟ incentives to discourage 
information asymmetry, in turn, reduces underpricing results in the omitted variable bias and leads to biased 
inferences from empirical work. Based on this rationale, the EWL model provides two separately testable 
models to explain factors affecting wealth losses and underpricing of IPO issuers as shown below in Figure 12. 
 
Wealth Losses 
Participation Ratio
Positive Relationship
Dilution Factor
Positive RelationshipEx-ante 
Uncertainty
Positive Relationship
Promotion Cost
Invariant Relationship
Underpricing
Participation Ratio
Negative Relationship
Dilution FactorNegative Relationship
Ex-ante 
Uncertainty
Positive Relationship
Promotion Cost
Negative Relationship
Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses TheoryEndogeneity occurs between 
promotion cost and the error term of 
the model as the decision to employ 
promotion to reduce underpricing is 
made by issuers when they intend to 
sell large stake of their holdings
Incentive of 
IPO Issuers 
Incentive of 
IPO Issuers 
 
Figure-12. Information Asymmetry Based on Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Rationale. 
 
The two testable hypotheses explain underpricing and wealth losses of IPO firms based on three 
dimensions: incentive of IPO issuers, promotion costs, and uncertainty surrounding the offering as shown in 
Figure 12: 
The first hypothesis, i.e. underpricing hypothesis, argues that underpricing decreases in line with 
promotion costs, participation ratio, and dilution factor while underpricing increases in uncertainty when 
controlling for promotion costs.  
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The second hypothesis, i.e. wealth losses hypothesis, argues wealth losses increase in line with the 
participation ratio, the dilution factor, and uncertainty, but are invariant to promotion costs. For both 
hypotheses, promotion costs increase in line with the participation ratio, the dilution factor, and uncertainty.  
Since the introduction of Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) theory, endogeneity correction model, and 
empirical results, number of researchers focused on examining the validity of the EWL theory in explaining 
the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. The central aim of this school of thought directed towards testing the 
endogenous nature of the relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing in the IPO market 
which is an important dimension of the EWL model. For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find some 
support for the prediction of the EWL theory employing 2,178 listed IPO firms in the U.S. market between 
January 1996 and December 2000, specifically in relation to explaining the underpricing of technology IPO 
firms. The authors document significant evidence showing that underpricing is higher for technology 
compared to non-technology firms because IPO issuers of the former sell and create fewer secondary and 
primary shares, and there are less participation ratio and dilution factor when they go public, respectively. The 
authors also find that when IPO issuers intend to sell fewer secondary shares, they show less care about 
underpricing and for this reason they employ less reputable underwriters who charger cheaper underwriting 
fees. They also find that when the ex-ante uncertainty of the technology firm is high proxied by a small size of 
the IPO firm, underpricing tends to be higher. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) document that when they 
treated underwriter reputation as an exogenous factor using an OLS estimation, they find a positive and 
significant coefficient between underwriter reputation and underpricing. However, after applying an 
endogeneity correction model using a 2SLS model with a robust instrument variable following Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) the authors find a significant and negative coefficient between prestigious underwriters and 
underpricing.   
Kennedy et al. (2006) examine the relative importance of six asymmetric information models in explaining 
the puzzling phenomenon of IPO underpricing of 2,381 IPO firms listed in the U.S. IPO market between 1991 
and 1998. The authors discover that the EWL theory offers the most compelling explanation for IPO 
underpricing in that country‟s IPO market. The authors also document a significant change in the underwriter 
reputation-underpricing relationship from positive to negative after applying the endogeneity correction 
method proposed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). Fang (2005) also cautions for not accounting for the 
endogenous choice between the issuer-underwriter matching in the bond market using 3,000 corporate 
nonconvertible bonds issued between January 1991 and December 2000 in the U.S. market. The authors apply 
the endogeneity correction procedure proposed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) finding that reputable 
underwriters charge higher underwriting fees in exchange for lower yields leading to higher net proceeds for 
bond issuers. Similar evidence also documented by Mantecon and Poon (2009) and Akkus, Cookson, and 
Hortaçsu (2016) show that the positive relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing found in 
the 1990s by previous studies disappears. This occurs after controlling for the endogenous choice of IPO 
issuers in selecting reputable underwriters when they intend to sell large portions of their holdings which 
changed to negative in the U.S. IPO market.  
 
5. Institutional Explanations        
The consideration of institutional explanations for IPO underpricing in the U.S. stock market has inspired 
the emergence of three dominant institutional-based theories, including lawsuit avoidance, price stabilization, 
and tax advantages hypotheses. 
 
5.1. Lawsuit Avoidance  
The existence of litigious characteristics of American investors has motivated the emergence of the 
lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. The likelihood of a linkage between IPO underpricing and litigation risk goes 
back to Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) who propose that U.S. IPO issuers deliberately underprice the value 
of their firms at the time of offering to avoid potential litigation risk from disappointed investors due to poor 
post-IPO performance. That is, the consequence of a lawsuit not only directly inflicts damages on the 
defendants including financial damages resulting from incurred legal fees and diversion of management time, 
it also extends to indirect damage including loss of reputation, capital and the likelihood of incurring higher 
costs of raising capital in the future (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). This lawsuit avoidance rationale is further 
extended and theoretically modeled by other researchers including Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor (1992) 
and Hensler (1995). The empirical validity of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis is tested by Lowry and Shu 
(2002) showing that approximately six percent of IPO firms in the U.S. were sued, with damages to plaintiffs 
averaging 13.3% of the proceeds of IPOs from 1988 and 1995.  
The empirical validity of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis is questioned by the contention that it is a U.S.-
centric model, while the phenomenon of IPOs underpricing is global. This argument implies that the existence 
of a litigious culture among American investors may not exist in global settings, so this theoretical 
explanation may fail to explain underpricing around the world. Empirical evidence refuting the litigious effect 
of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis on explaining IPO underpricing shows the absence this hypothesis having 
any economic significance in the U.K. (Jenkinsonn, 1990) Japan (Beller, Terai, & Levine, 1992), Finland 
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(Keloharju, 1993) Switzerland (Kunz & Aggarwal, 1994) Sweden (Loughran et al., 1994) and Australia (Lee et 
al., 1996).    
 
5.2. Price Stabilization  
The price stabilization hypothesis arises as a second institutional explanation of IPO underpricing. The 
basic notion of this hypothesis relates to the price support service that IPO underwriters offer in relation to 
post-IPO price stabilization, whereby underwriters intervene in the aftermarket to reduce potential price 
drops for a few days or weeks. The theoretical concept of price stabilization was originally devised by Booth 
and Smith (1986) formalized by Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) and proved its statistical validity in 
the U.S. market due to the empirical work carried out by Ruud (1993) and Ellis, Michaely, and O'hara (2000). 
However, the price stabilization rationale is criticized for being unobservable by investors, although it can be 
observed by market regulators. In other words, it is difficult to empirically know which IPO firms receive 
price support by underwriters and the magnitude and nature of this support is unknown to market participants 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). The lack of availability of such an exclusive dataset makes it a challenging 
task to examine the validity of the price stabilization hypothesis, especially in cross-country settings. 
 
5.3. Tax Argument  
The third institutional-based explanation for IPO underpricing is inspired by the trade-off between tax 
benefits and underpricing of IPO firms. Rydqvist (1997) empirically explores this tax benefit-based rationale 
in the Swedish IPO market and finds that before 1990, the Swedish tax system imposed a higher tax rate on 
employment income than capital gains. This created an inducement to pay employees by allocating 
appreciating assets in exchange for wages, and the offering of underpriced shares was a form of appreciating 
assets. Once the Swedish tax system was changed in 1990 to remove the higher tax on underpricing-related 
gains, thus removing management inducement to allocate underpriced shares to employees, the degree of IPO 
underpricing dropped from 41% in 1980-1989 to eight percent in 1990-1994. Similar evidence was 
documented in the U.S. IPO market by Guenther and Willenborg (1999) and Taranto (2003). However, this 
tax benefits argument for underpricing may not be useful in explaining the high degree of IPO underpricing 
observed in tax-free countries, such as the oil- and gas-rich countries2 where average IPO underpricing is 
around 250.17%, making the tax hypothesis questionable (Uddin & Raj, 2012). 
 
6. Ownership and Control Reasons 
Ownership and control theories contend that IPO underpricing works as an effective mechanism in 
shaping the shareholder base in order to deter outside investors from intervening in managing their firms 
once they are publicly listed. In addition, the existence of the agency problem due to the separation of 
ownership and control means that misalignment could exist between managing and non-managing 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The outcome, for example, of this misalignment is that managers can 
exploit their controlling authority to maximize their expected private benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders. Based on the above rationale, two main hypotheses emerged to explain the underpricing 
phenomenon, namely, the entrenchment of managerial control and agency costs hypotheses.    
 
6.1. Entrenchment Managerial Control  
The entrenchment of managerial control hypothesis is that owners or managers of IPO firms employ 
underpricing as a tool to maximize their control over the management of their firms by ensuring greater 
ownership dispersion (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). This hypothesis is empirically examined by Brennan and 
Franks (1997) who conclude that managers of U.K. IPO firms protect their private benefits by strategically 
allocating underpriced shares to small outside investors. The authors interpret this opportunistic behavior as a 
strategy those managers tactically adopt when they fear the consequence of close internal monitoring 
resulting from involving large block investors in the decision-making of their firms. That is, the presence of a 
widely fragmented post-IPO ownership offers reduced external monitoring, allowing insiders, such as 
managing owners and managers to have entrenched control over the company‟s management (Booth & Chua, 
1996). Therefore, underpricing works to create excess demand enabling self-driven managers to ration share 
allocation in order to ensure wider ownership dispersion, leading to greater control of management 
operations.  
Although the validity of the entrenchment of managerial control hypothesis has been empirically proven 
by Pagano and Panetta (1998) it has been criticized for not being an efficient way to protect private benefits of 
control. Engelen and Van Essen (2010) argue against the managerial control explanation. They contend that 
this mechanism might provide a rational elucidation for underpricing in the U.K. and U.S., but not in many 
continental European and developing countries as IPO issuers in those nations normally sell a small portion of 
their secondary shares after going public, hence they need not underprice to retain control over the firm. 
                                                          
2 Underpricing figure is average underpricing for the six Arabian Gulf countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and 
Oman. 
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Khurshed and Chahine (2007) provided support for the argument raised by Engelen and Van Essen (2010) i.e. 
the rationale of the managerial control explanation weakly explains whether block-holder ownership verifies 
the difference between family and non-family IPOs in France. Moreover, Wang (2005) rejected the rationale of 
the managerial control hypothesis in explaining IPO underpricing in China. 
Authors criticized the managerial control explanation for not being an efficient way to protect private 
benefits of control. For example, Field and Karpoff (2002) argue that instead of ensuring fragmented post-IPO 
ownership through the offering of underpriced shares, IPO firms can protect their private benefit of control by 
issuing non-voting shares when they go public.  
Conceptually, if the degree of underpricing of IPOs with voting shares is higher than IPOs with non-
voting shares then it can be said that the managerial control hypothesis is a good theoretical candidate to 
explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). Smart and Zutter (2003) 
empirically find the degree of underpricing of U.S. IPO firms that issue voting shares is higher than IPO firms 
that issue non-voting stocks. Field and Sheehan (2004) empirically detect no significant relationship between 
IPO underpricing and the creation of post-IPO shareholding domination.  
Finally, the managerial control hypothesis treats the employment of reputable underwriters by the issuers 
of IPO firms as an exogenous decision ignoring the choice of the underwriter as decided by the issuers. This 
happens when issuers intend to sell part of their holding before going public, and ignoring this endogeneity 
leads to omitted variable bias as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Chen and Mohan (2002), Chahine 
(2008); Mantecon and Poon (2009) and Jones and Swaleheen (2010). In this way, the validity of the 
entrenchment managerial control hypothesis is questionable. 
 
6.2. Agency Costs  
The prediction of the agency costs hypothesis is contrary to the prediction of the entrenchment of 
managerial control hypothesis of IPO underpricing proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997). The agency costs 
hypothesis proposes that due to a separation of ownership and control, misalignment might exist between 
non-managing shareholders and managers.  
Thus, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue that owners of IPO firms underprice their firms when they go 
public, aiming to attract large block-holders who might work as an internal monitoring agent of their firms to 
minimize agency problems between managers and shareholders. This, in turn, leads to maximizing the value 
of their firms post-offering. However, Field and Sheehan (2004) empirically find no supporting evidence of the 
relationship between IPO underpricing and the creation of post-IPO shareholding, thus questioning the 
rationale of the agency costs hypothesis. 
 
7. Behavioral Explanation 
Ljungqvist (2007) argues that the substantial amount of money left on the table by U.S. IPO issuers 
accounted for approximately $62 billion in 1999 and 2000, and that such substantial losses of issuer wealth has 
induced researchers to turn to behavioral explanations for IPO underpricing. In this section, the presence of 
informational cascades as a behavioral explanation is discussed where the central argument is that the IPO 
market is prone to the presence of „irrational‟ investors who bid up the price of IPO shares beyond their true 
value.  
 
7.1. Informational Cascades  
Welch (1992) develops a model showing that „informational cascades‟ can occur amongst IPO investors in 
an attempt to explain the presence of IPO underpricing based on the irrational investor argument. The author 
contends that IPO investors formulate their investment actions sequentially, whereby the bids of later 
investors are conditioned on the bids of earlier investors, irrationally ignoring their own information. When 
latter investors observe the presence of a number of successful initial sales by earlier investors, then later 
investors reach an understanding that earlier investors possess some form of favorable information. 
Subsequently, later investors disregard their own information and invest in whatever earlier investors invest 
in (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, & Welch, 1993).  
In contrast, when later investors observe the presence of a number of unsuccessful initial sales by earlier 
investors, then later investors withdraw their intention to invest irrespective of their own information. Due to 
the presence of this irrational investment behavior, demand can be either low or, alternatively, snowballs over 
time (Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008). 
Welch (1992) argues that the likelihood of cascades provides early investors with the power to „demand‟ 
further underpricing in order to commit to purchasing IPO shares, thus ensuring continuity of a positive 
cascade. Hence, the presence of informational cascades among IPO investors can explain IPO underpricing. 
However, the possibility of empirically examining the presence of informational cascades among IPO investors 
requires the availability of exclusive information that shows bid patterns of IPO shares on the first trading 
day, something that might only be available in advanced countries where sophisticated and transparent 
trading systems are available.  
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However, the empirical validity of the informational cascades hypothesis is proven amongst Israeli IPO 
investors (Amihud, Hauser, & Kirsh, 2003) and also amongst U.S. IPO investors (Pollock et al., 2008). 
However, employing the informational cascades hypothesis to explain differences in IPO underpricing across 
stock markets may be difficult due to the unavailability of exclusive information that shows the bid patterns of 
IPO shares on the first trading day in cross-country settings.  
 
8. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to provide succinct but relatively sufficient review of competing for IPO 
underpricing theories. The authors recognized a lack of availability for theoretical explanations of the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing in the literature. This indeed left researchers and investors in the dark when 
it comes to deciding on which model to employ to understand why IPO issuers folate their firms at a discount? 
This paper presented a discussion to explain the motivation of IPO issuers to go public followed by a 
presentation of the role of key parties in the IPO process. Subsequently, the authors provided a discussion of 
13 theoretical models based on information asymmetry, institutional explanations, ownership and control 
reasons, and behavioral explanations to explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing.  
Based on this review, the authors argued that the underpricing phenomenon is ultimately explained by the 
existence of asymmetric information in the IPO market. The paper contended that asymmetric information 
models are considered to be well-established and modeled theories compared to other non-information 
asymmetry-based models. In particular, this paper favored the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) theory 
developed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001). This is because the theoretical explanation offered by the EWL 
model is the only one that solves the problem of information asymmetry between the issuer and investor, 
while accounting for the endogenous relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing.  
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